

"The universal Spanish Nation."—Mr. CANNING. Declaration against France.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SPAIN.—ENGLISH MINISTER'S COMPLAINT AGAINST THE PRESS THERE.—The phrase, which I have taken for my motto, will remind the reader of what took place in the Spring and Summer of 1808, and, if he has forgotten it, he need only refer to the Register, Vols. XIII and XIV, where he will find, under the head of "SPANISH REVOLUTION," the history of the origin and grounds of the war, which, from that time to this, England has been carrying on in Spain.—It will there be seen, that the invasion of Spain by the French was viewed in different lights by different persons in England; that while some of us, amongst whom I was one, regarded it as a fine opportunity for the people of Spain to recover their freedom and form a new government; others saw in it nothing more than an opportunity of opposing a new resistance to Buonaparté, caring much less for the liberties of the people of Spain, than for that security which they thought the event likely to bring to themselves. We contended that if England took any part in the contest she ought by no means to concern herself in the internal affairs of the country, and, above all things, that she ought to avoid, as she would avoid the poisoned chalice, making herself the supporter or partizan of any part of the old reigning family: we contended, in short, that the thing to be desired was a real, radical revolution in Spain, without which there was not the smallest chance of eventually succeeding in a resistance of France. Our opponents contended, that England ought to take a decided part for Ferdinand the 7th, though it was notorious, that his father was still alive, that his father denied the right of the Son to the Crown, and though it was equally notorious, that both of them had abandoned the people of Spain, that both of them, and the junior members of the family, had made a formal abdication of the Crown in favour of the Emperor Napoleon. Our opponents contended too, that the only way to secure success to the resistance against France, was for us to set our faces against every

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thing of a revolutionary tendency; and, in short, that the Spaniard who should think of a revolution, or of any new species of government to the prejudice of Ferdinand, ought to be considered as not less a traitor than if he were actually fighting under the banners of France.—There appeared to me to be something so foolish, so wild, so perfectly mad, in this last set of notions, that it was impossible for me to impute them to mere want of understanding. I could not help thinking, and I said at the time what I thought, that those who held this language were much more afraid of the example of Spanish liberty regained, than they were of the establishment and extension of French despotism; and I must say that he who has not arrived, by this time, at a conviction of the truth of this opinion, must have a mind incapable of profiting from observation, or must have been a very inattentive observer of what has been passing during the last three years.—To our opponents, therefore, the present state of things in Spain gives much less pain than might be imagined. The French are sweeping over the country, and there appears little ground to expect that they will not become its conquerors; but, at any rate, there has no revolution taken place in Spain; the people of Spain are not republicans; the people of Spain have not regained their liberties.—But, how is all this to end? How is it to end with regard to England, who has already expended so many millions of money in the cause of Ferdinand the seventh? This question cannot be answered with certainty yet; but a pretty good guess at it may be formed from the facts, which have recently come to light, and which it was impossible any longer to disguise, with all the means which a hired press holds forth for that purpose.—We have observed, for some time past, that Cadiz was far from being a scene of harmony; we saw Gen. Graham, whom the parliament and the city had thanked, quit the theatre of his glories, and join the army in Portugal. Mr. Sheridan's speech blubbering with joy, and the Scotch poems, seem not to have ac-

corded with the sentiments of the Spaniards at Cadiz. The Spanish General Lacy, who had answered the publication of General Graham, we have seen selected for choice service by the Spanish government. There was, however, in the publication of General Graham itself, quite sufficient to convince any reasonable man, any man not completely hood-winked by our hired news-papers, that harmony between our people and the Spaniards was at an end. If any doubt of this fact could remain till now, it surely can remain no longer, after the reading of the documents, which are subjoined to this article, and upon which I shall now proceed to offer the reader a few observations.—The Note of our Minister, Mr. Wellesley, contains a formal complaint to the Regency of Spain against the freedom of the *Press* and even against the freedom of *speech* at Cadiz. He says, that he has hitherto forbore to complain of the *rumours* and *writings* which have for some time been circulated in Cadiz, in the belief that his *forbearance* and *moderation* might *disarm* the parties; but that the papers that have been published, as well as the reports that have been circulated have, *at length*, become so injurious to the British *good name* and *character*, that he can no longer look with indifference on the *unjust* and *unfounded* calumnies, which are daily circulated against his country.—Gentle reader, it is the writing of a minister plenipotentiary, of a representative of your king, that you have just been reading; and, therefore, you are to suppose, that in such a case good name and character mean different things; for as to tautology, you are not to suppose such a person capable of using such a figure. You must bring to your aid some such principle of judging, also, with regard to the unjust and unfounded calumnies of which this gentleman is pleased to talk; for, when, amongst common mortals, did you ever hear of *just* calumnies, of *well-founded* calumnies. Calumny means, *false charge*, *groundless accusation*, and, of course, to talk of *unjust* and *unfounded* calumnies, was the same as to tell the Spanish Secretary of State, that his countrymen had uttered *unjust false charges*, and *unfounded groundless* accusations against our country. But, reader, these are liberties which I have observed frequently taken with our poor mother tongue, by the bright geniuses, who have worn black trenchers upon their heads, and long sweeping gowns upon their bodies, while they were drink-

ing at the rich fountain of the learned languages, at Oxford and Cambridge, supported there too, by the rents of very good farms and houses, commonly called college property.—Well, but let us not forget the subject before us. The complaint of this our minister is pretty intelligible, I must confess. It leaves no room for doubt. It tells the world, that, at Cadiz, the language both through the press and through conversation, is too free for the English minister to tolerate, or, at least, that it is such that he can no longer hear it without complaint, and that it is levelled against the British good name; It tells the world, in short, that this country is calumniated at Cadiz to such a point, that our minister can no longer refrain from making an official complaint of it to the Government of Spain.—But, *what* are these calumnies? our King is calumniated, we are told, and so is his government, but *what* are these calumnies? Mr. Wellesley says, that in order to “give a specimen of the “terms in which these *assertions*” (meaning, I suppose the *calumnies*) “are conveyed, he sends the Secretary of State a “paper to read.” I wish Mr. Wellesley had sent the paper to *us*. And why do we not see it? What is the reason for keeping it from us? Ours is certainly the basest press that ever existed in this world; for it is not to be believed that those to whom these state papers were communicated, had not the means of coming at the paper in question. Aye, and they have it, too, but it does not suit their purposes to publish it. They take good care to publish every thing flattering to our government, that issues from the press at Cadiz; and their not having published this also, is a pretty clear proof, that they found it not so very easy to refute.—Mr. Wellesley, however, gives, in his Note to the Spanish Secretary of State, something in the way of description of this offensive publication. He says that it imputes to our king, to our government, and to the British Nation, intentions destitute of honour, of justice, and of good faith, and entirely subversive of all the principles with which Great Britain has come forward to aid the cause of the Spanish Nation; that it asserts that the Spanish provinces bordering on Portugal, were placed under the command of Lord Wellington; that the Spanish army was to be placed under English officers; that it was to be formed into an army, British, in fact; and that it was the design of the British Government to send to Cadiz a

reinforcement of troops, sufficient to take possession of the city and Island, and retain it, in the name and possession of his Britannic Majesty. — The word it in place of the word them, we owe, I suppose, to some principle of the “learned languages.” But, to the matter, leaving the sound, and leaving too the delicious grammar of the original description, to those of a taste sufficiently refined to relish them. To the *matter*, I say, and here are, it must be confessed, some pretty thumping charges. They are, by no means, of an equivocal nature. Whether they be true or false, is what I shall not pretend to determine. I leave that task to the advocates of the war for Ferdinand; but this I say, that in this state paper, Mr. Wellesley has not proved them to be false. He says, that, considering all that Great Britain has done for Spain, he “ought to be far from being under the necessity to refute charges such as those contained in this paper.” Now, who would not imagine from this exordium, that he was about to enter upon a regular refutation of these charges? The exordium does not stop here, however, but proceeds, to say, in substance, that nothing short of the critical circumstances of the moment could make him consent to “suffer the humiliation of vindicating the honour of his country,” against the calumnies contained in the paper in question. — Now, then, surely the *refutation* is coming! Surely, we are now going to hear our honour *vindicated*, by this our minister, in Spain. Let us hear him, then, he says, that notwithstanding the *humiliation* that he feels in condescending to enter the lists with the author of the offensive publication, his desire to preserve undiminished the sentiment of respect and esteem with which the two nations are mutually animated, makes him consider himself, “as under an obligation,” to to do what, think ye, Reader? Why to do what he talked of, to be sure, to *refute* the charges contained in the publication. Oh! no! To *refute* means, to *prove* the *falsehood* or *error* of any thing; and Mr. Wellesley in this, his state paper, does no such thing. He *denies* in the most positive and solemn manner; in other cases he *affirms* with equal solemnity; but he, in no case, *proves*, or *attempts* to *prove*, that which he denies, or that which he affirms. Proof is derived from *evidence* or from *reasoning*, and Mr. Wellesley has produced neither, in support of his denials and affirmations. Whether he could have pro-

duced any evidence or reasoning sufficient for the purpose, which he obviously had in view, is more than I can say, but, those denials and affirmations as they now stand unsupported by proof, amount to nothing beyond assertion; and, though one assertion is as good as another, where there is nothing but assertion on either side, there can be *no refutation*. In this case, too, it was the more desirable to have proof in support of our minister’s assertions, because the publication is omitted which he thinks it necessary to answer. He, indeed, gives us the substance, as he says, of a part, at least, of that publication. That which he gives us, amounts to no more than assertion, unsupported by proof; but, it does not follow that the publication itself contained no proof in support of its assertions. In answer to a publication containing nothing but assertion without proof, assertion without proof is as much as we have a right to demand; but, in answer to a publication, of which I myself state nothing but the assertions, proof may fairly be demanded at my hands; because by omitting to give the whole of the publication of which I complain, I leave the reader at liberty to infer, that the assertion of my opponent was backed by proof. — Mr. Wellesley, concludes his note by requesting that all proper publicity may be given to it by the Spanish government, in order to prevent the serious consequences which must inevitably result, should the Spanish Nation once believe the offensive publications. But, did Mr. Wellesley imagine, that this end would be answered by the publishing of an answer containing assertions without proof? If he did, he judges very differently from the way in which I should have judged in such a case; and, especially, when I perceive that his Note is full of reproaches and insinuations against the persons who have issued the publications complained of. If these persons were contemptible, whether in point of rank, or of character, it is obvious that no answer should have been given them, and no serious notice taken of their efforts. If their rank or character were such as to make their influence dangerous, an answer to them might become necessary; but, then, the answer should have been full and complete, carrying conviction to every impartial mind of the falsehood of the mischievous publications. Any thing short of this was calculated to do harm rather than good; to inflame rather than assuage passions at work against us; and whatever

Mr. Wellesley may think of the powers of his pen, I scruple not to advise him, the next time he has the task of preserving harmony to perform, especially amongst such a people as the Spaniards, not to talk too much of consenting "to suffer the *humiliation* of vindicating the honour of his "country" against their attacks.—Far better would it have been, it appears to me, if he had followed the example of the Spanish regency, so significantly pointed out to his attention by the Spanish secretary of State, in these words: "The council of regency has more than once been "the mark of calumnies, more, or less injurious, both in words and writings; but, "certain of its rectitude of conduct, and "thoroughly satisfied that it has its support "in the opinion of good men," far from paying attention to the attacks upon it, it has remained perfectly tranquil, in the conviction that nothing but the combined efforts of both nations can bring their common cause to a successful issue.—Certainly, this was the conduct for wise and upright men to pursue, conscious that they were doing the best for their country; or, at any rate, it is as clear as day light, that there was no choice between *silence*, on the one hand, and a complete *refutation* on the other.—The answer of the Spanish government is civil. It is, like most papers of the kind, full of expressions of respect, friendship, and confidence; but it is dryness itself. The fairest skin in the month of March is not dryer. It is dry even to chapping. And it talks too of the contemptibleness of the persons, whose publications and language are complained of, and who are described as "*some individuals*," who aspire to an *ephemeral* celebrity; and it concludes by expressing a confidence that this answer of the Regency will "*suffice to calm the inquietude which momentarily was excited in the mind*" of our Minister.—This answer is, in fact, upon the score of the complaint, a *gentle rebuke*, and as such it has been, I see, regarded by our hired print, the *COURIER*, the Editor of which remarks, with manifest chagrin, not to say, malice, that the Spanish Regency has "*omitted to promise to restrain, by SEVERE PUNISHMENT,*" such discourse and writings as have been the subject of the complaint of our Minister. But, we must see the whole of this article of the *Courier* of the 17th instant, because it will enable us to judge of the real state of things better than any paper received from Cadiz. The papers from

Cadiz do not contain the offensive publications, nor even the specific one sent to the Secretary of State by our Minister; and, as was observed before, it has, through the venality of our press, been suppressed here. Just as was the paper of General La Pena, while the *answer* of General Graham was published in every print in the kingdom. Therefore it is necessary to be the more particular in attending to articles of home manufacture, like this of the *Courier*, from which we shall easily discover what he himself (the silly fellow!) was above all things desirous to disguise from our knowledge. "We lament," says he, "that "our Government should have felt itself "under the necessity of complaining of "the calumnious reports and publications "circulated at Cadiz against the honour "and good faith of this country. We "had thought our efforts had been so *rigorous*, our motives so *well understood*, and "our *disinterestedness* so manifest from the "commencement of the contest, that none "but the enemy could assert, what not a "Spaniard would believe, that we were "influenced by *one sordid, selfish, or ungenerous principle*. That such rumours and "writings have been instigated by the "enemy there can be no doubt; but even "they, we should think, could no longer "impose upon any one after the *solemn pledge* thus given and recorded by our "Government, that we have no views of "aggrandizement or territorial acquisition, either in Europe or America, at "the expence of the Spanish nation; that "our *whole and sole view is to assist Spain* "in recovering her liberty and independence; and that the success of these "efforts will be *our best and most glorious reward*. What, but the most noble principles, could have influenced us in "doing what we have done, when, if we "had only consulted *our own interests*, we "might have gratified them to the utmost "extent! What, if we had demeaned ourselves not merely as tame spectators, "but as active agents against Spain! "What, if we had said, *you have united* "yourself with the common enemy of "man; you have acted as the engines of "that *accursed fiend*, take the reward of "your servility and folly, and follow and "feel the fate of those nations whom you "have helped him to subdue! What, if "we had carried our power to the shores "of the new world, invited the American "Provinces to declare themselves independent, and promised them our coun-

tenance and protection! *Here were tempting baits* for our interests and our commerce, if we had looked only to them. But we have soared above them; Spain wanted our assistance, and we immediately *forgave and forgot* that she had aided the common enemy against us; we flew to her *as brothers*, before almost she had returned into the scabbard *the sword she had drawn against us*.—The reply of the Spanish Regency to Mr. Wellesley's note is expressive of confidence in our good faith, and of gratitude for our assistance. BUT we remark the omission in that reply of *all promise to restrain by SEVERE PUNISHMENTS* practices which, in the present circumstances of Spain, amount to *HIGH TREASON* of the blackest die."

—This is a paragraph to be kept constantly before the eyes of the people; before the eyes of the people of *both nations*; for, we have here, we may be well assured, the sentiments of OTHERS besides the editor, or, to use Mr. Wellesley's phrase, the sentiments "of a certain class;" a class, which, God knows, all of us have long had but too good reason to know. —In our remarks upon this paragraph, let us proceed in due order, concluding with the chagrin here expressed, that *no severe punishments* were to be inflicted on those in Cadiz, who had made such free use of their tongues and their pens. This man talks about the vigorousness of our efforts, and the disinterestedness of our motives in a very vigorous style, but he has not condescended to give us any proofs of either. We have twice entered Spain with an army, I mean under Sir John Moore, and under the Lord Viscount Talavera; and we have twice got out of Spain again, in what manner I shall not describe; but this the Spaniards know, if we do not, that the vigour we displayed there was attended with consequences most fatal to many of them. We have seen Rodrigo taken in sight of our army, we have seen Badajoz besieged by our army, but not retaken. Tarragona has fallen in sight of our fleet, and after being, as the report of the Spanish commander states, visited by us, who declined to risk any troops in his defence. Now, it is not for me to say whether we had it in our power to do more in these several cases: perhaps, we did, in every case, all that we were able to do, but this is quite certain, that we did not do much; or, at least, that our efforts were not calculated

to give the Spaniards any very high notion of our vigour.——We must not forget, too, that, upon various occasions, the Spaniards have not derived much credit from fighting in company with us. At the Battle of Talavera, we know what was said of Cuesta; we know what our newspapers called him and his soldiers, though it is perfectly notorious that we left the care and protection of our sick and wounded to them, and, that they afterwards were upon the same route *between us and the French*. At the battle of Barrosa our language with respect to them was still less equivocal; our newspapers called the Spanish General a traitor, who was called not much better by some of the speeches elsewhere; our commander, General Graham, appears to have sent home to England, the eagle taken from the French in that battle, though he himself was under the command of a Spanish General; and, at last, we saw him engaged in a paper war with the Spanish officers commanding at, and in the neighbourhood of Cadiz. At the battle of Albuera, the case was not much better. The Spaniards committed errors; our commander was unable to tell the state of them after the battle was over, and in a few days afterwards, our commander in chief is unable to tell what is become of them. I do not choose to give my opinion as to the truth or falshood of what was said of the Spaniards upon these different occasions; but this all the world knows, that in the defence of many of their towns the Spaniards have shewn great and most obstinate bravery, and, that there is abundant proof that their Guerillas, as they are called, have, in numerous instances, displayed a degree of courage and perseverance hardly to be equalled. Indeed, it is notorious, that our newspapers are continually representing these Guerillas as composed of men ready to devote themselves to destruction for the sake of their country, and they go so far as to tell us that we may expect from the efforts of these Guerillas alone the final extirpation of the French. These Guerillas are composed of Spaniards, and how has it happened, then, that the Spaniards, when engaged in company with us, have acted in the manner, in which they have been described in our newspapers to have acted? This is, to say the least of it, extremely unfortunate; and, whatever we may think of the matter, the Spaniards, especially those in Cadiz, have not read with complacency the remarks of our newspapers upon their

conduct when engaged in company with us.—But, this writer tells us that our *disinterestedness* must have been so manifest to the Spaniards, that they must have been so well satisfied that we have not been influenced by one sordid or *selfish* principle. Verily this is a very foolish writer; for in another part of this very paper of the 17th inst. he says in answer to the Morning Chronicle, who had asserted that the war in Spain was of no utility to us; in answer to this, he says, that the war is of great utility to us, because it compels Buonaparté to “employ his main force against Spain, instead of directing the whole against Ireland!” Aye, I know very well that this is the notion; and the Spaniards know it too; for it has been said a thousand and a thousand times over, in the Parliament and in the public prints, and yet this man in this very same newspaper of the 17th instant, tells us that none but a Frenchman could ever assert, that we have been actuated by one selfish principle, and that the Spaniards must now be stupid indeed if they do not believe that our *whole and sole view* is to assist them, and that the success of these efforts will be our *best and most glorious reward!* —But, says he, if we had consulted our own interests we might have gone to South America and invited the provinces there to declare themselves independent. And what should we have got by that, unless, indeed, we had resolved to carry liberty into South America? And if we had done that, a declaration of independence would, by no means, have cut off the connection between Old and New Spain, both countries being inhabited by Spaniards, and being so closely connected, by all the ties of interest and of blood. Spain, in that case, would have yielded to Napoleon without a struggle. There would have been no ravages and no bloodshed, and the whole force of Spain would have been directed against us, if peace had not taken place. By the war in Spain we have, hitherto, prevented this; but, we might have prevented it for ever by giving liberty to Spain; by a war for the people, instead of a war for Ferdinand. It is, therefore, not at all owing to our disinterestedness that we forebore that which the Courier threatens with respect to Spanish South America, which were no tempting baits, or, if they were, they were beyond our reach, or, at least, not to be made use of for our own purposes. What he says about our forgetting and forgiving the

conduct of the Spaniards, and about her *drawing the sword against us*, is something too impudent to merit an answer.—We now come to the complaint of this writer against the Spanish regency for omitting, in their answer to Mr. Wellesley, “all promise to restrain, by SEVERE PUNISHMENTS, practices which, in the present circumstances of Spain, amount to HIGH TREASON of the blackest dye.” —So, reader! This is the sort of treatment that this hired writer in England, points out for those who make what our minister in Spain deems too free a use of their tongues and pens at Cadiz. A law of libel, informations *ex officio*, jail for years, heavy fines, harrassing prosecutions, bail for a man's life; all these are not sufficient for this prostituted English writer. He is for dragging the Spaniards to a scaffold or a gallows for writing, aye, and for speaking that which our minister there deems improper! This is the way that he and those who think like him, and of whose words he is merely the repeater, would insure to the people of Spain the blessings of *liberty!* High treason, of the blackest dye, too, for men to utter their apprehensions about the introduction of foreign troops into their country; about placing part of their country under the military command of a foreign General; about placing their native Soldiers under the command of foreign Officers; to express their apprehensions of these things is here deemed a crime amounting to High Treason of the blackest dye, and, of course, meriting the punishment of an ignominious death, a punishment for not promising to inflict which the Spanish government is reproached by this venal English writer! This is the liberty, is it, which we flew “like brothers” to insure to the people of Spain; the liberty of being swung from a gallows-tree, if they dare to express their fears at seeing their sea ports, their provinces, and even their armies, put under the command, and into the hands of foreigners.—It is possible that the suspicions, and fears of which we have been speaking might be groundless. For my part I believe that they were groundless. But am I to represent a Spaniard as a wretch worthy of death, am I to call him a traitor and censure his government for not punishing him as such, merely because he entertained such suspicions and fears? But, why do I ask these questions? There is no man, who is not at bottom the enemy of all liberty amongst men, who

must not execrate the spirit by which these remarks of the Courier were dictated. The source whence those remarks have flowed is all despotism, sheer despotism, unmixed with a single particle of any thing else. It would suffer no human being to write, speak, breathe, or think freely; and, it seems to be ready to expire in the overflowings of its own venom, because it cannot extend its poisonous influence to every corner of the earth.—The reader will bear in mind, that we are continually speaking of the miseries, the degradation, the baseness, of those nations who permit the *French* to garrison their towns and to take the command in their provinces. I beg the reader to call to his recollection how our public prints have treated all such nations, with what scorn they have spoken of them, how execrably *base* they have represented them to be. Yet, I really have never heard of any case, in which the army of the natives has been put under the command of *French officers*. What impudence, what insolence is it, then, for this writer to talk thus about the nations who submit to the obtrusion of the *French*, while, at the same time, he would have the Spaniards hung up like dogs merely because they make what he deems a too free use of their tongue or pen in speaking or writing against the introduction of foreign troops into their territory? "Aye, but the troops, in *this* case, are *English*!" And, you insolent hireling, do you, then, really believe, that, in the eyes of other nations, an act changes its nature, and from bad becomes good, merely because *we* are the agent?—But, perhaps, our own example will be cited. The Spaniards may be said to be unreasonably jealous in their opposition to the introduction of foreign troops by us, seeing that the English very quietly see great numbers of foreign troops introduced into England; see them quartered and stationed in England; and, in some cases, have seen several counties of the kingdom, formed into a military district, *placed under the command of a German Baron*. The Spaniards may be told this, and, as a further proof of the disposition of the people of England, the Spaniards may be told, that Roman Catholic officers are permitted to serve in these *foreign* corps without taking an oath, which *Irish Roman Catholics* are obliged to take, in order to be capable of rising to rank equally high. I am aware, that all this may be said to the Spaniards; but the answer is short: that men differ in their

tastes; and that, by no course of fair and sound reasoning, can it be made out, that because foreign troops are introduced into England, foreign troops ought also to be introduced into Spain. The people of England may *like* to have foreign troops brought into their country; but, if the people of Spain do *not like* to have foreign troops brought into their country, they have surely a right to say so; they surely ought not to be stigmatized as traitors and doomed to the gallows, because they express their apprehensions upon so important a point.—As if to leave nothing wanting to make an exposure of his folly or something worse, this writer, in only two days after his denunciations against the poor Spaniards, falls upon Napoleon as an *enemy of the freedom of the press*! The occasion was as follows: the Editor of a news-paper, called the *Abeille du Nord*, published at Altona (in the territories of Denmark) has been obliged to apologize for having inserted in his paper *some passages of history*, or, at least, of works published a considerable time back. The apology is thus worded, under the date of Aug. 27, 1811.——"The Editor of this Paper, having imprudently inserted in "the Papers No. 51, 66, and 67, an anecdote taken from works published a considerable time back, and which do not belong "to the history of the present time, which "is the object of this paper, makes known, "that in consequence of this indiscretion, "it has been imposed as a punishment by "the Police, and enjoined by the supreme "authority, that he must abstain from inserting anecdotes drawn even from the "history of times past, calculated to offend "Governments on friendly terms with that of "Denmark." Upon this the COURIER makes the following remarks, and they are well worthy of the attention of the reader. They are all that was wanted to the exposure of the hireling who has put them forth to the world.—"The "Editor of the *Abeille du Nord*, a Paper "printed at Altona, has been forced to "apologise again for having inserted an "anecdote drawn from history, and has "been cautioned by his Government to "abstain from inserting any anecdotes of "times past which might give offence to "friendly Governments: that is, to Buonaparte!! What a fear and a despotism does "the conduct of this ruffian evince! It will "soon be deemed HIGH TREASON, we "suppose, to have an historical work in "the library of an individual."—The

reader must be struck with the singular aptness of this quotation. Here it is predicted, that Napoleon *will* make it *high treason*; but, this writer himself had made it high treason two days before for Spaniards to express their apprehensions at putting their towns, their provinces and their troops into the hands of foreign troops and foreign commanders. When this paragraph was written, that of the 17th was not recollected; though, to say the truth, the impudence of these hirelings sets all decency as well as truth at defiance.—The *Abeille du Nord* was, it seems, to suppress that which might give offence to friendly governments; and it was because their publications gave offence to our government, that the Spaniards at Cadiz were found fault of by our Minister; and, for having given this offence, the Courier does not content him with demanding an apology; no, he would have “severe punishments” inflicted by way of terrific example; he calls the crime *high treason of the blackest die*, and, of course, would send the offenders to be hanged and quartered. And this man has the impudence, and that, too, almost in the same breath, to attribute the gentle reproof of the *Abeille du Nord* to “the fears and the despotism of the ruffian” Buonaparté.—And, does this man and his associates imagine that they can deceive the world by such invectives as these? Do they imagine, that, because they can cajole the people of England; because they can deceive and cheat them, they can also deceive and cheat the people of the Continent and of America? Do they imagine, that the Editor of the *Abeille du Nord*, for instance, is not able to make a comparison between the *liberty of the press* in Denmark and that in England? Do they suppose, that the world are to be made noodles of like the poor cowed-down frightened wretches who read their purchased pages? Oh, no! The people of the Continent understand this matter very well. They understand the worth of our liberty of the press as well as we do, and, if it were to reach them, the paragraph of the Courier must make them laugh heartily.—When the system of deception, of base fraud and hypocrisy, in the carrying on of which this Courier is one of the agents; when this vile system of cheateries, this imposture of impostures, will come to an end I know not; but, as long as it exists, and I exist, it shall have in me, if not a powerful, at least an irrepressible foe.



COLONEL M'MAHON's appointment and some other topics must wait till my next.

W^m. COBBETT,

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
20th September, 1811.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—Note of the Honble. Henry Wellesley, the English Minister in Spain, transmitted to Don Eusebio de Bardaxi y Azara, first Secretary of State. Dated Cadiz, August 5, 1811.

Most Excellent Sir,—I have hitherto abstained from calling the attention of the Spanish government to the rumours and writings which have for some time been circulated in Cadiz, in the belief that my forbearance and moderation might disarm those who have endeavoured to weaken the bonds of friendship and confidence which so happily, and with so many advantages to the cause, have hitherto subsisted between Great Britain and Spain. But the papers that have been published, as well as the reports that have been circulated, have at length become so injurious to the British good name and character, and so adapted to promote the interests of the enemy, and sow dissensions between the allied nations, that I should be wanting to the duties of my charge, and to all the sentiments of an Englishman, anxious for the happy issue of this glorious and interesting cause, if I could look with indifference on the unjust and unfounded calumnies which are daily accumulated against my country.—To give a specimen of the terms in which these assertions are conveyed, and which originate, as it appears to me, from a certain class of persons, I think it will be sufficient to request your Excellency to read the subjoined paper, in which are imputed to my Sovereign, to his Government, and to the British nation, intentions destitute of honour and justice, and of good faith, and entirely subversive of all the principles upon which Great Britain has come forward to aid the cause of the Spanish nation. But the complaints and imputations contained in this paper, relative to the conduct of Great Britain, rumours noticed in the month of March last, are again revived,—that the Spanish provinces bordering on Portugal were placed under the military command of Lord Wellington; that the Spanish army was to be placed under English officers; and in a word,

withdrawn from subordination to the Spanish military authorities, in order to form an army truly British. To the British Government is also attributed the design of sending to Cadiz a reinforcement of troops, sufficient to take possession of this city and island, and retain it in the name and possession of his Britannic Majesty.—Considering the sacrifices which great Great Britain has made in support of the Spanish cause; considering her repeated declarations of the conduct which she has resolved to observe with respect to the Spanish colonies, some of which have been published in the Gazette of the Regency; considering the decisive proof which she has just given of her disinterested views, by offering her mediation between Spain and the Colonies which have refused to acknowledge the authority of the mother country; I ought to be far from being under the necessity to refute charges such as those contained in this paper. In fact, it was necessary that we should find ourselves in a situation so critical as that in which we are reduced to the narrow bounds of this place, the salvation of which depends on harmony and good understanding, so indispensable at all times, but especially at this critical moment, to consent to suffer the humiliation of vindicating the honour of my country, attacked as it has been by publications, the malignant tendency of which is sufficiently apparent. Desirous however, to preserve, without the least alteration, the sentiments of respect and esteem with which the two nations are mutually animated, I consider myself as under an obligation to deny, in the most positive and solemn manner, in the name of his Britannic Majesty, that of his Government, and that of the whole British nation, all the imputation of views of aggrandizement, or territorial acquisition, either in Europe or America, at the expense of the Spanish nation. With the same positiveness, I deny that there is any foundation for the interpretation given to the notes which I presented in the month of March last, suggesting that the Spanish provinces on the borders of Portugal should be placed under the temporary authority of Lord Wellington; as by this no more was intended than to authorise him to derive from them the military supplies which they were capable of furnishing. I, in like manner, solemnly affirm, that neither my Sovereign nor his Government had any intention to render themselves masters of Cadiz; and that if any reinforcements

were sent to this city, it was solely and exclusively in order to contribute to the defence of this important position, and preserve it to the Crown of Spain.—Lastly, I repeat, what on many occasions I have declared to your Excellency, that Great Britain in taking part in this contest had no other view than to assist the glorious efforts of the Spanish nation to recover its liberty and independence; and that she persevered in it without any idea of her own aggrandizement, or any exclusive advantage which she might derive from the unfortunate circumstances to which the Spanish nation has been reduced; but solely to contribute to the expulsion of the enemy, and the re-establishment of the integrity and independence of the Spanish monarchy.—In conclusion, most Excellent Sir, I earnestly intreat your Excellency will be pleased to present, with the least possible delay, this note to the Council of Regency; and I think myself obliged to demand from the Spanish Government, that all proper publicity may be given to it, in order to prevent the serious consequences which must inevitably result, should the Spanish nation once conceive the intentions of the English nation to be such as the injurious suspicions which the rumours and writings circulated throughout this city are calculated to inspire.—I have the honour to reiterate to your Excellency the assurances of my distinguished consideration. (Signed)

H. WELLESLEY.

ANSWER.

Dated Cadiz, 7th August, 1811.

Sir; Without loss of time, I presented to the Council of Regency the note which your Excellency was pleased to transmit to me on the 5th instant, as well as a copy of the paper lately printed and published in this city. His Excellency, fully impressed with what your Excellency has been pleased to state concerning the malicious rumours which have been for some time so industriously circulated in these parts, has ordered me above all things to declare, that believing himself as much interested as your Excellency in discrediting reports and writings which can in the least degree offend the respect and decorum due to his Britannic Majesty, his Government, and the English nation, he will most willingly hasten to publish the note of your Excellency, with this reply; well persuaded that their publication cannot fail to undeceive the incautious, who

have allowed themselves to be seduced by people who intend to destroy the friendship and amity which happily, and without the least interruption, subsists between the two allied nations; and without which, neither union nor concord can subsist between their respective Governments.—In regard to the imputations to which your Excellency refers in your note, considering them as injurious to the august Sovereign as to the Government of the British nation, they cannot certainly be attributed to the generality of the inhabitants of Cadiz,—of this bulwark of Spanish independence,—much less to the nation in general, which has given so many proofs of its gratitude for the generous assistance of Great Britain. They can, therefore, have their origin only in the imagination of some individuals, who, influenced by the enemy, or carried away by the desire of being singular in their opinions and writings, aspire at an ephemeral celebrity, to which they sacrifice the most sacred interests of their country, which they do not know or prefer to their own.—Fortunately, the number of persons engaged in introducing mistrust between the two allied nations is very limited, and so very inferior to those who properly appreciate the generous efforts of Great Britain in the present contest, that they can never obtain the end which they have proposed: but rather, on the contrary, the artifice employed by the enemy to sow discord being once known, as well as the instruments made use of, both will be included in the execration of all good Spaniards, who, without dispute, constitute the greater part of those who compose this vast monarchy.—Nothing proves so much what I have stated, as the injurious suspicions which accompany the reports and rumours spread respecting the pretended occupation of Cadiz by the troops of his Britannic Majesty, to which the French have contributed from the first day they presented themselves before this place for the purpose of introducing discord, and producing mistrust in the minds of its inhabitants. The object of this imposture being known, it will not be difficult to comprehend the views of those who are so eager in circulating and giving credit to them; but the public in reading the concluding expressions of your Excellency on this point, and well persuaded before, that the two Governments cannot do less than agree in respect to the number of troops necessary for the defence of

so important a position, will remain tranquil in the confidence with which the Government must inspire them, and in the good faith of the British Cabinet.—The same Council of Regency has more than once been the mark of calumnies, more or less injurious, both in words and writings; but certain of its rectitude of conduct, and that nothing could be attached with the least foundation, contrary to the decorum and dignity of its representation; thoroughly satisfied that it has its support in the opinion of the good, his Excellency has in consequence charged me to inform your Excellency, that the Spanish nation, as well as its Government, far from paying attention to the insidious remarks with which the enemy has continually endeavoured to dissolve the firm bonds which unite the two powers, are completely convinced that nothing but the combined efforts of both can bring to a glorious conclusion the arduous enterprise for which they have fought; and they are therefore penetrated with the just gratitude they owe Great Britain, for the lively interest with which, from the commencement of the war, it has protected and assisted Spain in defence of its King, and political independence.—The expressions contained in this reply, and the sincere protestation, that the Council of Regency ardently desires, as your Excellency must know, to every day draw closer the relations of friendship and reciprocal confidence between both nations, will, without doubt, suffice to calm the inquietude which momentarily was excited in the mind of your Excellency by the rumours and writings which gave occasion to your Excellency's note; and at the same time, I flatter myself, will ensure the continuation of the aids which the painful situation of Spain renders so indispensable, in order to happily conclude the heroic contest in which it is engaged, and whose success must necessarily be promoted through the united efforts of the two united nations. I reiterate to your Excellency my great esteem and consideration. God preserve your Excellency many years.

EUSEBIO DE BARDAXI Y AZARA.

SPAIN.—*Decree of the Cortes, 19th of June 1811.*

1. The Mediation offered by Great Britain, for the purpose of conciliating the Provinces of America, is accepted.

2. The indispensable basis must be, the

submission of the Provinces to acknowledge and swear allegiance to the Cortes and the Government, and to name Deputies who shall represent them in the said Cortes, and shall incorporate themselves with the other Representatives of the Nation.

3. That all hostilities shall be reciprocally suspended, and all persons, of either party, who are prisoners, shall be set free.

4. That the pretensions of the Provinces at variance with the Mother Country (disidentes) shall be heard, and attention paid to them as far as justice will permit.

5. At the expiration of eight months from the commencement of the negotiation, or sooner if possible, a Report of the progress of it shall be made to the Spanish Government.

6. Great Britain shall be permitted, during the negotiation, to trade with the said provinces, it being left to the Cortes to consider whether they shall be admitted to a share of the trade with all the provinces of America.

7. The negotiation must be concluded within fifteen months.

8. If, at the expiration of that time, it is not accomplished, Great Britain shall suspend all intercourse with the Provinces at variance with Spain, and shall assist the Mother Country in bringing them back to their duty.

9. The Government, in its answer to the English Minister, shall previously explain to him the motives which have induced it to accept the mediation, and to preserve its honour.

REMARKS, on the above Decree, published in the English hired print, the *COURIER*, of the 4th Sept. 1811.

We are too well aware of the perplexing difficulties, with which the leading Patriots of the Peninsula are environed, to inculcate harshly or without reluctance even the present Regency of Spain. With far greater pain do we feel ourselves called on to arraign the measures, or to question the motives of the Spanish Cortes, from the newness of the members to the science of legislation and the arts of government, and the strangeness of the circumstances which require all the helps of the maturest and most manifold experience, united to an intuition and foresight which no experience can of itself supply. We have systematically, and from the very commencement of their arduous struggle, both reprobated and exposed the ungenerous

scorn, and not less impolitic than irrational abuse, with which the speakers and journalists attached to the Grenville party or the Burdett faction, have at all times slandered the successive governments of Spain, and not seldom the Spaniards in general. The giant size of the dangers which assailed the insurgent nation on all sides we saw no less plainly than they, and measured far more distinctly, because we did not look at them through the confusion and exaggerating mist of panic and party-passions, and because we reflected on them, which these writers neither did or could do, from the habitual prostration of their spirits before that shapeless blaze with which unexampled success had invested unexampled iniquity. We were among the first too in preparing the public mind for the obstacles likely to arise from the prejudices and defects of the Spaniards, obstacles which ever appeared to us more truly formidable than the numbers, skill, and veteran courage of their invaders, and which at all times damped the confidence with which we should otherwise have predicted the ultimate success of the invaded nation. We never presumed to affirm unconditionally the final triumph of the righteous cause; but we did, and still do venture to anticipate, that if it fail, it will not be solely or principally by the armies of Napoleon, but through folly, languor, and treachery on the part of Spain itself, through the unnatural aid afforded to her oppressors, by the indolence, mismanagement, bigotry, and cowardly selfishness of her great lauded proprietors, whose own estates (an awful truth, not confined to the Peninsula, yet strangely overlooked in the common presumptions of patriotism), whose own vast estates, we say, are bribes to them against their own country. The war with France presented to our minds evils far less fatal than the civil war between the good and the bad among the Spaniards themselves, than the civil war between the heroic and defective qualities of the Spanish character itself—between patience and fortitude, and contempt of death, strong nationality and useful antipathies on the one hand, and languor, want of foresight, and indiscreet application to their allies; of feelings which should have been either suspended or reserved for their enemies, of jealous pride, religious zeal, and that ill-timed overweening sense of their own self-sufficiency, in which their national haughtiness acts the unconscious pandar for their national sloth.

But while we were alive and broad awake to these depressing truths, we could not, however, look at these defects in a separate thought from the virtues with which they are in fact, alas! too indissolubly interblended, or from the honourable feelings which are the common source of both—

—twy-streaming fount,
Where good and evil flow, honey and gall!

Above all, for that can never be too often said, which never can be too often recollected, we could not forget, and we have never ceased to remind the public, that with all their faults and prejudices, and the miserable blunders or treachery of their leaders, the Spaniards have endured more, done more, and effected more against the common enemy of civilized humanity, than all the Courts, veteran Commanders, and disciplined armies of the whole Continent—more in four years than all the rest of continental Europe for almost twenty. And we have been accustomed to seal up the whole with the one home-truth, that if we are fighting the battles of Spain abroad, the Spaniards are fighting the battles of Great Britain in their own country, at the price of its devastation, and with their own ruined cottages, fields, and vineyards before their eyes.—Our readers will, many of them, perhaps, think it unnecessary for us to have thus anxiously prefaced the following animadversions on the general measures of the Cortes, and especially on its Decree of June the 19th; but we well knew the triumph, with which any apparent deviation on our part from our former hopes and predilections for the Spanish cause would be blazoned forth by the Party, which has signalized itself by its despair and abuse of the Spanish combatants, in the ordinary vehicle of its destruction; and that it would probably be attributed to influences which we disown, and to a change of opinion elsewhere which, were it as true as we believe it false, we have no means of knowing. We held it not unwise therefore to preclude the charge, as far as it is in our power: that is, to take away its plausibility, and disarm it for the candid and dispassionate. In many points have our wishes been disappointed in one only our expectations. We confess, that misled by historical analogies, chiefly of America, and not duly appreciating, or rather at that time dwelling on the effects of English descent, English laws, customs, literature, religion, and connection on the character of the first American Revolution-

ists, we had expected too much from the convocation of the Cortes in Spain: and though we still believe, that this measure has been of advantage, and still hope that it will become more so, yet on the whole, we confess that we have been disappointed. As to the importance of a Representative Body during a revolutionary war, our opinions remain unchanged; but had we at any earlier period have been as well acquainted with the measures and results of the Cortes summoned in the war of the succession, we should have been less sanguine in our expectations of finding in the present Cortes all those essentials, which must combine to render a body of men assembled, a genuine Representative Body.—We may proceed to the measure, which has occasioned these prefatory remarks. The decree in question respects a point of the deepest interest to Great Britain, and of Spain herself, both directly and indirectly. It is obvious, that had there been nothing objectionable in the different articles of the Decree, yet the Decree itself would remain, in its domestic bearings, an encroachment of the Legislature on the Executive Power, and one sad specimen among too many others, both of ignorance as to the principles of a just Government, and of that all-meddling disposition incident to bodies of men suddenly invested with a power, for which neither their education had fitted, or their former habits prepared them; while in its foreign relations, it was surely imprudent, needlessly and prematurely to obtrude on the public attention the only point, in which the interests of Spain, whenever she shall have been re-established in her integrity, and those of her zealous Ally, can be thought to stand in opposition to each other: the future interests of Spain, not the present, and in truth according to our convictions her supposed rather than her real interests. What measure more fatal to the hopes of the Peninsula could Napoleon have dictated to his emissaries and secret agents than ere the battle was half fought to stir up jealousies and heart-burnings among the allied combatants themselves concerning the fruits of their victory?—Such would have been the character of the Decree, from its very title and object; and the contents are every way answerable. The various accessory and aggravating reasons deducible from the temper, constitution, and past treatment of the Colonies, and the present circumstances of the Mother Country, we

shall reserve for an after discussion: at present, we confine ourselves to such objections, as lie on, or rather put out from, the surface of the articles themselves. We scarcely need notice the hostile feeling and absurd pride, betrayed in the selection of the absolute and offensive word, submission, in the 2d article, or the same haughtiness combine with injustice in the tone and spirit of the fourth. Proposals so worded might Buonaparté make to an insurrectionary town, which he had beleaguered, in the insolence of ostentatious clemency; but such a body of Representatives should at no time make to their constituents or fellow-subjects—how much less then the present imperfect, though perhaps blamelessly imperfect, Cortes in the present circumstances of Spain? But if these articles are to be lamented, as having a direct tendency, and almost seeming to imply a design, to alienate their South American countrymen, far more must we regret the sixth and eighth, as equally unjust and irritating both to the Colonies and to Great Britain. When we recall the enthusiastic generosity with which the latter, without making a single condition, without extorting a single promise in her own behalf, poured and has continued to pour into Spain, her clothing, arms, treasures, and the very pride and pith of her military force, with a confiding liberality which placed its last step to the uttermost limit of prudence, and which halted not but in obedience to the paramount duty of self-preservation, when we re-peruse the strong and glowing language, in which the noblest Spanish patriots, and the very Cortes itself, conveyed their gratitude and expressed their admiration; when we reflect, that the conduct of the British Government was the organ and interpreter of an almost universal sentiment in the British nation, and that the Tyrant himself has officially attributed the prolongation of the contest, and the delay of his success, to the circumstance, that Great Britain had, for the first time, come forward as a principal in a military war; as we could never have expected, so can we not even now derive from the noble character of uncorrupted Spanish Patriots, a niggardly doling out of returns, not in the measures of gratitude, or even of a wise and liberal policy, but in the spirit of a hard bargain, so much for necessity, and so much in expectation of a greater gain in repayment! You may trade for 15 months to the revo-

lutionary Colonies, first, because we expect from you a restoration of their exclusive possession to ourselves, and which we ourselves cannot achieve; and secondly, because it is out of our power to prevent you, or to receive any advantages from them but through you:—but whether we shall grant the privilege, where it as yet remains in our power to prevent you, that must be matter for future consideration. In other words, our decision will depend on the result of a struggle between our hopes and fears, whether by this very prevention we shall or shall not be likely to throw the yet unrevolted into a community of means and aims with the revolutionary colonies. However we in England may appreciate the wisdom of the scruple, yet the Cortes, as Spaniards, ought assuredly neither to forget or under-rate the notorious fact, that we might have acquired the exclusive trade of the Spanish Settlements, if we would have bribed them from the mother country, at that time our open enemy, by an offer of independence. That our Commanders were prohibited from making them this offer, let this prohibition be politic or impolitic, could only have proceeded from the sacred principle of doing as we would that others should do to us.—But if the sixth article be, as we have shewn, at once impolicy and meanness of spirit, the eighth is characterised by the most glaring extravagance, and a folly of short-sighted selfishness almost suicidal. From Great Britain hitherto we have received our chief and amplest supports. Stripped of our colonies, from Great Britain alone can we receive any assistance. And yet while we add year after year to her burthens, we demand of her that she shall stop up the very channels by which she may in part recruit her resources, and while we want treasures which we by our own strength are unable to provide, we will prevent our ally from procuring them for us. The blood of her noblest children is lavished in our behalf, and yet as far as in us lies we will deprive their mother of the very means, by which she is to furnish them with arms, of the gold and silver, for which alone the Spanish farmers will supply them with food. And then the modest request, that if we fail to reconcile the colonists, as a common friend, we should hasten to cut their throats, as volunteer enemies and substitute combatants against our own interests—this really is folly that might lead even a reluctant mind to a suspicion of more than folly.

Must we not ask, what is the state of those colonies? And how came they to this state? and what measures have you taken to amend it?—But of this on a following day.

PORTUGAL.—*Extracts of Dispatches from Baron Douro of Wellesley and Viscount Wellington of Talavera and of Wellington, and Conde de Vimiera, to Earl Liverpool, one of the Secretaries of State. Published in the London Gazettes of different dates, as under stated.*

Quinta Joao, July 18, 1811.

The Army of Portugal broke up from their position on the Guadiana on the 14th instant, and have moved towards Truxillo. I have not yet heard that any troops had passed that town towards Almaraz; or that the cavalry which had been about Talavera and Lobon, had retired further than Merida.—They are fortifying the Old Castle of Medellin, as well as that at Truxillo.—*General Blake embarked his corps in the mouth of the Guadiana on the 6th.* As soon as General Blake's corps embarked, the body of the enemy's troops, which had marched towards the Guadiana, and had turned towards Cartaja, retired from the frontier towards St. Lucar.—I understand that the troops belonging to the fourth corps, which Marshal Soult had brought into Estramadura, have marched towards Granada. There is nothing new on the side of Valladolid, excepting that Joseph Buonaparté had returned to Spain, and, it is said, arrived at Burgos with an escort of about three thousand men on the 5th instant.

Portalegre, July 25, 1811.

The enemy's cavalry left Merida on the morning of the 17th. The enemy have since continued their march upon Almaraz; and on the 20th, one division of infantry had arrived at Placentia. On the same day Marshal Marmont was at Almaraz, and other divisions had marched upon Truxillo in the same direction. One division of infantry and some cavalry still remained at Truxillo according to the last accounts.—There is nothing new in the North. Joseph Buonaparté was at Valladolid on the 10th, and proceeded on the 12th on his journey towards Madrid.

Castello Branco, Aug. 1, 1811.

I have moved the whole army to their left. I propose that they shall take up their cantonments in Lower Beira, instead of Alentejo.—The army of Portugal re-

main in the position which I informed your Lordship that they occupied in my dispatch of the 25th July, excepting that the division at Placentia has extended through the mountains to Bejar and Banos.—By a letter from General Silveira of the 21st of July, which I received on the 26th, I learnt that General Santocildes had retired with the army of Galicia from the neighbourhood of Astorga to Mancanal on the 17th, in consequence of Marshal Bessieres having collected at Benavente a force consisting of 11,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry.

Fuente Guidaldo, Aug. 31, 1811.

The enemy have made no movement of any importance since I addressed your Lordship on the 14th. On that evening a detachment, consisting of about one thousand two hundred infantry and cavalry, arrived at Gata, which is on the south side of the mountains which separate Castile from Estramadura; and on the following morning they surprised a small picket in St. Martin de Trebejo, under Lieutenant Wood, of the 11th Light Dragoons, whom they made prisoner with ten men, and went off that evening to Moralego, and on the next morning to Monte Hermoso.

COUNT DE LILLE (Louis XVIII.)

The London Gazette of Saturday the 7th of September, 1811, contains an Advertisement, offering 200*l.* Reward for the discovery of the author or sender of the following Threatening Letters sent to this person, and which Letters are stated, in the Advertisement, to have been as follows:

Whitehall, Sept. 7, 1811.

Whereas it has been humbly represented to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, that various anonymous threatening Letters have been sent to the Count De Lille, and others of the French Princes, of which the following are extracts;—

No. I.

A. Monsr.
Count De Lille
Hartwell House
Aylesbury
Bucks

You are of a bad Race, mercy is in the Protestant, you imposing Vagabonds Die by nostra manus.

I visit your House every week you damn'd Villain—look at your Effigie inclosed.

No. II.

The Count de Lille a French Refugee
Halford House
Aylesbury
Bucks

signed Gordonius.

Bone has offered a Dutchy for your Head, he shall have it.

Mind, a good Boat and many of us Prisoners of War will seize on you, put you into it at Yarmouth you Enemy of Europe. A Man can die but once you Vagabond Louis.

No. III.

The Count Lille
Hartwell House
Aylesbury
Bucks

Your proceedings will not do, our intentions have been delayed in hopes of something being abjured or done on your part and the Prisoners of War your countrymen restored to their Native land our party encrease very strong against you and only temporize for a time, but many are near your Person of our Party which makes us sure of our designs. So if I do not get my Friends home you shall be arrested, murdered, shot or slain. Charlotte Corday shall visit you first. You are at our Bar and renounce, adjure, or die by our hands.

No. IV.

Le Comte De Lille
Halford House
near Aylesbury
Bucks.

You shall be attacked from us in our Prison Wincanton, Crediton, Tiverton, and other Places.

No. V.

His Highness's
Duke de Berri
or De Condé
or De Lille
Wimbledon.

If there be any commotion among the People. The Populace know the Road to the House you live at. Resign your pretensions, live in peace, or be overcome in L'Assyle.

Given at our association of Warning.
(Here follows an offer of a reward of 200l. for discovery.)

HAYTI. (St. Domingo)—Coronation of the Negro King and Queen, 2nd June, 1811.
At Cape François (Cape Henry now)
Great preparations were, on the 27th May,

making for the Coronation of their Majesties of Hayti, to take place on the following Sunday, previously to which a number of his favourite Generals were ennobled, some made *Princes*, some *Dukes*, some *Counts*, some *Barons*, some *Chevaliers*; this new creation could not but astonish the gaping multitude, little used to such sights, by the splendour of their appropriate dresses, some of purple, some of blue, some of white silk or satin, richly ornamented, whilst embroidered cloaks or mantles gracefully flowed from their shoulders, and their heads covered with gold laced hats, turned up in front with a button and plume, exhibited a likeness of the ancient nobility, as they are represented in some of our old paintings.—The previous matters being arranged, the ceremony that next took place was the consecration of the national standard or colours, which was performed with great pomp by the *archbishop*, who they say is a *German*, and a man of some erudition: but the grand business of all, and that which far outshines all the rest, was the coronation of their Majesties, which took place on *Sunday the 2nd of June*, in a large square called the *Champ de Mars*, where temporary canopies and coverings were erected for that purpose. This day was ushered in by ringing of bells, bands of music, innumerable discharges of cannon, and every demonstration of joy. About seven o'clock, their Majesties in their state carriage, drawn by *eight white horses*, attended by *Madame Dessalines*, in her carriage and six, and the other nobility, in such carriages as they could procure, brilliantly attired, proceeded to the *Champ de Mars*, where his royal Majesty, with the Queen, left their carriage, and ascended a temporary throne, richly ornamented; here the King, having previously put a Crown of gold, richly furnished with precious stones, upon his head, now took it off, and delivered it, with another for the Queen, into the hands of the *Archbishop*, who crowned their Haytian Majesties, with all the pomp and ceremonies used on such great occasions. Thus graced by the diadem, to which also they added grace, this august pair retired into the royal tent, with the *Archbishop* and some of the great officers of state, and there received the holy sacraments; which being finished, their Majesties descended, and having taken their carriage, attended in the same manner, returned to the Palace, where they held a *Levee*, and received the congratulations of the Ne-

bility and Gentry, on the auspicious occasion, and also the compliments of *Captain Douglas and Captain O'Grady of the British Navy*, whose ships were seen at anchor in the port. After the Levee, at about two o'clock, their Majesties and the Nobility, in the same order of procession, repaired to another square, where under the shade of the entwined boughs, well arranged for the purpose, a repast, consisting of 600 covers, was prepared, to which all the English and American merchants were invited, and where Captains Douglas and O'Grady had the first places of honour. At this entertainment, the King, rising from his seat, gave the following toast: "*My Brother, the King of Great Britain*," which was drank with three times three; to which he added, "*may he prosper and be successful against Buonaparté, and continue the barrier between that tyrant and this kingdom*." The next toast was given by the Archbishop, "*The King of Hayti*," which was also drank with three times three. After this their Majesties returned in the same order to the Palace, before which a great body of troops, to the number of near ten thousand, paraded for a long time, every company preceded by its band of music, which, together with the incessant firing of guns, ringing of bells, and rude shouts of the populace, almost stupefied the senses. The Royal Cavalcade then took a ride about the town, and scattered money in great profusion among the people; and the business of this great day was at length concluded with splendid illuminations, and an Opera at the Theatre. On Monday, 3rd of June, *high mass was celebrated*, and the *Te Deum sung*, at the Cathedral; after which their Majesties had a Levee, and received the compliments of the Nobility and Gentry, and the evening was concluded with illuminations, and a Comedy at the Theatre.

HAYTI.—Royal Ordinance.—Renewing the prohibitions made to foreign Merchants, established in our Kingdom, to sell in retail the cargoes consigned to them, and to fix the quantity of each kind of Merchandize they are to sell.

Henry I, by the grace of God, and of the constitutional Law of the State, to all whom these presents may come greeting: Being informed that the foreign merchants

established in our kingdom, do not conform to the regulations of the 15th of October, 1804, which forbid them to sell in retail the cargoes they receive. That frequent complaints have been made to us by the foreign merchants relative to the difficulty of recovering the amount of their goods disposed in retail, to Haytian shop-keepers: Wishing to put an end to all such complaints, and afford to foreign traders greater facility for the recovering, from Haytian shop-keepers, the amount of the sales of the cargoes confided to them. We have ordered and do order what follows:—**Art. I.**—We renew, as far as is necessary, the prohibitions made in the above-mentioned Ordinance, of the 15th October, 1804, to all Captains of foreign vessels arriving in any of the ports of our kingdom, of selling their cargoes in retail to either shop keepers or individuals.—**II.**—No foreign merchant, who shall have vessels consigned to him, shall be permitted to sell the cargoes to another foreign merchant, nor have them sold by retail by women in their keeping; and three months, beginning the first instant, is allowed to those to whom this may apply, to set off their stock, and close their stores.—**III.**—The foreign merchants shall not be allowed to sell a smaller quantity of merchandize than what are here designated, to wit: 10 barrels beef, 10 ditto pork, 25 cases soap, 10 ditto candles, 10 firkins butter, 10 ditto lard, 10 baskets or boxes sweet oil, 8 do. codfish, 20 cases do. 20 bls. flour, 5 pipes wine, 10 cases do. 6 bls. lamp oil, 5 hhd. beer or porter, hats, shoes, &c. or the case or bbl. cheese and hams of bacon wholesale, cordials, do. dry goods by the bale, case, trunk, bbl. hhd. without retailing any by the piece or ell.—**IV.**—Whomsoever shall act in contravention to the present Ordinance shall forfeit 3,000 dollars for the first offence; and in case of a repetition, double that sum, and three months imprisonment.—We do order that these presents, to which is affixed our Royal Seal, be addressed to all the courts and tribunals of justice, and administrative authorities; that they be entered on their records; that they observe them, and cause them to be observed throughout the kingdom; and that our Minister of Justice be charged with its execution.—Done at Cape Henry, the 19th June, 1811, year 8 of the independence. **HENRY.**